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Torture and Public Policy: Mohamed v. Jeppesen 
Dataplan, Inc., Allows “Extraordinary Rendition” 
Victims to Litigate Around State Secrets Doctrine 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,1 the Ninth Circuit 
examined the state secrets doctrine as it relates to the War on Terror. 
The plaintiffs, alleged victims of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(“CIA”) “extraordinary rendition” program, sued the private 
corporation providing logistical support for plaintiffs’ so-called 
“torture flights”—shuttling prisoners from their home countries to 
CIA “black site” prisons and other locations. The government 
intervened before an answer had been filed and claimed that the case 
must be dismissed on the pleadings as its very subject matter is a 
state secret barred by Totten v. United States.2 Although the district 
court agreed, the ruling was appealed and reversed by a unanimous 
three-judge panel.3 
On appeal, the court declined the government’s invitation to 
extend the harsh Totten bar on all judicial remedies whenever a state 
secret is implicated. Instead, it adopted the flexible evidentiary 
framework presented in United States v. Reynolds4 allowing the case 
to continue on remand as long as evidence that is truly a state secret 
is not indispensable to a prima facie case or to a valid defense.5 The 
Mohamed ruling will allow litigation to continue, for now, on 
evidence amassed by the plaintiffs from publicly available sources.6 
 
 1. 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009). After this Note was written, the opinion was 
amended and reissued by the same judge that wrote the original opinion. The new citation is 
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009). The amendments were 
made to limit the language of some sweeping dicta in the first version of the opinion, but they 
do not change the holding of the court nor any part of the case relevant to this Note. 
 2. 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
 3. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997. 
 4. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 5. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1009. 
 6. Sources include public disclosures from repentant foreign governments who were 
involved with the CIA and statements from a former Jeppesen employee. See Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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The problem with this outcome is that although it is favorable to 
these litigants who admittedly have public sources, the next set of 
alleged victims to torture may not be as lucky. This standard, in 
tandem with an earlier Ninth Circuit case, thus creates a perverse 
incentive for the government to curb all disclosures to the public in 
order to insure their own immunity. 7 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. Factual Background 
1. Allegations of torture 
All five plaintiffs allege torture, forced disappearances, and secret 
incommunicado detention performed by U.S. agents or foreign 
governments in concert with the CIA.8  
a. Plaintiff Mohamed, an Ethiopian citizen and legal resident of 
the United Kingdom, alleged that he was flown to Morocco, severely 
beaten, and had his bones routinely broken.9 Interrogators allegedly 
cut him with a scalpel from head to toe, “including his penis,” and 
then poured “hot stinging liquid” into the wounds.10 He was then 
transferred to a CIA “dark prison,” further tortured, deprived of 
food, and for twenty-four hours a day kept in near-darkness and 
subjected to loud noises like the screams of women and children.11 
Mohamed spent the next five years at Guantanamo. During the 
pendency of this appeal he was released to the United Kingdom 
without being charged.12 
b. Plaintiff Britel, an “Italian citizen of Moroccan origin,” was 
transferred to American custody after his arrest for immigration law 
 
 7. If somehow the court could have found a standard that allowed revealing 
government information notwithstanding the privilege, the perverse government incentive 
would abate dramatically. Exactly how to do this is admittedly unclear and is not discussed in 
this Note. It is merely meant to draw attention to this particular repercussion of the current 
standard. 
 8. Plaintiffs allege that they were held in secret without counsel, consular agents, or 
family knowing of their whereabouts, much less given access to them. See Complaint ¶¶ 3, 8, 
104, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. 07-
2798), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/mohamed_complaint20070530.pdf. 
 9. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 998. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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violations in Pakistan.13 Britel alleged that he was beaten, deprived of 
food and sleep, and threatened with “sexual torture, including 
sodomy with a bottle and castration.”14 He was released, then 
detained again, coerced into signing a false confession, convicted, 
and sentenced to serve fifteen years in a Moroccan prison.15 
c. Plaintiff Agiza, an Egyptian citizen seeking asylum in Sweden, 
alleged that he was captured by Swedish authorities and handed over 
to U.S. agents who flew him to Egypt.16 He was there “severely and 
repeatedly beaten” for five weeks while in a “squalid, windowless, 
and frigid cell.”17 He was also placed on a wet mattress, with 
electrodes on his “ear lobes, nipples and genitals,” and partially 
electrocuted.18 Agiza spent two and a half years in detention before 
being provided with a trial before a military court, convicted, and 
sentenced to fifteen years in an Egyptian prison.19 
d. Plaintiff Bashmilah, a Yemeni citizen, was in Jordan visiting his 
infirm mother when he was detained by the Jordanian government.20 
They allegedly physically and psychologically abused him, transferred 
him to U.S. agents who flew him to Afghanistan, and placed him in 
solitary confinement in twenty-four-hour darkness.21 Then he was 
placed in “twenty-four-hour light and loud noise,” and shackled in 
painful positions.22 He “attempted suicide three times.”23 Next, he 
was flown to a “CIA ‘black site’ prison,” which had alternating white 
noise and “deafeningly loud” music.24 In the end, he was tried for a 
petty crime, “sentenced to time served abroad, and released.”25 
e. The final plaintiff, al-Rawi, is an Iraqi citizen and has been a 
legal resident of the United Kingdom since 1994. Al-Rawi was 
 
 13. Id. at 997. 
 14. Id. at 997–98. 
 15. Id. at 998. 
 16. Id. at 997; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, STATE OF DENIAL: EUROPE’S ROLE 
IN RENDITION AND SECRET DETENTION 67 (2008), available at http://www.amnestyusa. 
org/stoptorture/pdf/Europe%20renditions%20whole%20doc%20low%20res.pdf. 
 17. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997. 
 18. Id.; see also Complaint, supra note 8, at ¶ 145. 
 19. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997. 
 20. Id. at 998. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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traveling to Gambia on business when detained by the Gambian 
Intelligence Agency and interrogated by U.S. CIA agents.26 He was 
flown to Afghanistan, detained in the CIA “dark prison” where loud 
noises played twenty-four hours a day, then flown “to Bagram Air 
Base, where he was ‘subjected to humiliation, degradation, and 
physical and psychological torture by U.S. officials.’”27 He was 
beaten, threatened with death, and then shackled in “excruciating 
pain” for his trip to Guantanamo.28 Finally, he was released and 
returned to the United Kingdom, apparently without being 
charged.29 
2. Role of Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 
Each of the prisoner plaintiffs were allegedly transported 
inhumanely to various prisons aboard a Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 
(“Jeppesen”) flight. Preparation for each flight began with the 
passengers being stripped naked, cavity searched, placed in a diaper, 
covered by a hood and overalls, shackled in pain-positions, and 
chained to a chair or stretcher.30 For every leg of these transfers, 
Jeppesen, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boeing,31 allegedly provided 
the flight services and logistics.32 
A former employee of Jeppesen, Sean Belcher, gave a sworn 
declaration that Jeppesen apparently provided these services because 
“‘the rendition flights paid very well.’”33 A supervisor told him, “We 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id.; see also FRONTLINE/World Extraordinary Rendition: Interviews: Bisher al-
Rawi, available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/rendition701/interviews/ 
bisher.html [hereinafter PBS] (transcript of interview with Plaintiff al-Rawi). 
 30. See Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997–98; PBS, supra note 29, at 4–5; Complaint, supra 
note 8, passim. 
 31. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997. 
 32. Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 11. The flight logistics allegedly entailed “pre-departure 
flight planning services, including itinerary, route weather, and fuel plans for both aircraft 
involved in their renditions.” Id. They “procured necessary landing and overflight permits for 
all legs of the rendition flights; and through local agents, arranged fuel and ground handling 
for the aircraft; filed flight plans with national and inter-governmental air traffic control 
authorities; paid passenger fees for the crew; and made arrangements to secure the safety of the 
aircraft and crew on the ground.” Id. It should be remembered though that Jeppesen is not 
accused of actually torturing anyone. It is only accused that they “knew” or “should have 
known” that people were going to be tortured and yet Jeppesen continued to aid and abet the 
torturers with their logistics. 
 33. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 999 n.1. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/6/2010  2:17 PM 
117 Torture and Public Policy 
 121 
do all the extraordinary rendition flights.”34 Belcher also testified that 
“there were some employees who were not comfortable with that 
aspect of Jeppesen’s business because they knew some of these flights 
end up with the passengers being tortured.”35 However, Belcher 
testified that his supervisor explained “that’s just the way it is, we’re 
doing them.”36 
B. Procedural History 
1. Original complaint 
Plaintiffs filed suit against Jeppesen under the Alien Tort Statute 
(“ATS”),37 which allows foreign nationals to sue in U.S. courts for 
torts in violation of U.S. treaties or gross violations of customary 
international law.38 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Jeppesen 
was either “actively participating” or “aiding and abetting” in the 
“torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” of the 
plaintiffs by agents of the United States and allies in foreign 
governments.39 
Before Jeppesen filed an answer to the complaint, the United 
States Government moved the court to intervene in the case, and at 
the same time moved to dismiss the complaint.40 The government 
asserted the state secrets privilege and gave two declarations from 
then-CIA Director General Michael Hayden, satisfying the 
procedural requirements of invoking the privilege.41 One statement 
was redacted and public, while the other was classified and heard in 
 
 34. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 35. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 36. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Jane Mayer, Outsourcing: The C.I.A.’s 
Travel Agent, NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/ 
archive/2006/10/30/061030ta_talk_mayer. 
 37. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 38. See Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 999; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 39. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 999. Torture has long been recognized as a violation of 
customary international law, as would be aiding and abetting torture. Torture is also a violation 
of several U.S. treaties. Therefore, the ATS appears to have been appropriately invoked. See 
generally Robert Johnson, Extraordinary Rendition: A Wrong Without a Right, 43 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 1135, 1157–60 (2009). 
 40. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1132–33 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008). The motion to intervene was made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a). Id. 
 41. Id. at 1134. 
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camera. Plaintiffs objected to the dismissal of the case,42 but did not 
oppose U.S. intervention.43 
2. Ruling of the district court 
The district court44 allowed the United States to intervene and 
agreed with the government’s reasoning for dismissal.45 In granting 
the motion to dismiss, the court found that the state secret doctrine 
articulated in Reynolds barred this case from continuing.46 It 
reasoned that “at the core of Plaintiffs’ case . . . are ‘allegations’ of 
covert U.S. military or CIA operations in foreign countries against 
foreign nationals [which are] clearly . . . state secret[s],” and thus 
categorically barred from litigation.47 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The concept of a state secret is not new, but it does tend to be 
developed only when we are at war. It first appeared in American 
jurisprudence in Aaron Burr’s treason trial,48 and it was further 
defined in the aftermath of the Civil War, the Cold War, and now 
the War on Terror. The doctrine today is marked by “[t]wo parallel 
strands”49 from two landmark Supreme Court cases, Totten v. United 
States,50 and United States v. Reynolds.51 Various circuits have applied 
the standards from these cases, including the Ninth Circuit. 
A. Totten v. United States 
In Totten, the estate of an alleged spy claimed the United States 
had not adequately compensated him for espionage services rendered 
during the Civil War.52 Allegedly, President Lincoln had 
commissioned the spy to proceed south, ascertain the strength of the 
 
 42. Id. at 1135–36. 
 43. Id. at 1133. 
 44. Northern District of California, Judge James Ware. 
 45. Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1134–36. 
 46. See id. at 1136. 
 47. Id. 
 48. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). 
 49. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 569 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 50. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
 51. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 52. Totten, 92 U.S. at 105. 
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Confederate Army, and “procure plans of forts and fortifications, and 
gain such other information as might be beneficial to the 
government of the United States,” for which he would be paid $200 
a month.53 The Court of Claims found that he had in fact faithfully 
performed his charge behind rebel lines during the entire period of 
the war, but he had only been reimbursed for his expenses.54 
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that such a contract for 
espionage services should not even be litigated in a court of justice.55 
The Court reasoned that public policy forbids the revelation of such 
contracts, given the inevitable need for a detailed presentation of the 
contract in order to sustain an action.56 Furthermore, any espionage 
contract necessarily contains an implied covenant to never reveal its 
existence, and such a covenant would be broken by merely bringing 
suit.57 
B. United States v. Reynolds 
In Reynolds, three civilians were killed in a B-29 crash while on 
“a highly secret mission of the Air Force,” testing secret electronic 
equipment.58 The estates of the civilians asked the government to 
produce a report to show the negligence of the military. The 
government resisted, asserting that “it has been determined that it 
would not be in the public interest to furnish this report.”59 The 
district court ordered production of the documents to assess the 
validity of the government’s claims, but the Air Force refused.60 
Judgment was entered for plaintiffs and then affirmed at the court of 
appeals.61 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the government was 
allowed to assert the privilege and prevent the discovery of the 
evidence.62 They reasoned that “[t]oo much judicial inquiry into the 
 
 53. Id. at 105–06. 
 54. Id. at 106. 
 55. Id. at 106–07. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 106 (“Both employer and agent must have understood that the lips of the 
other were to be for ever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter. This condition 
of the engagement was implied from the nature of the employment.”). 
 58. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 2–4 (1953). 
 59. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60. Id. at 5. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 10–12. 
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claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege 
was meant to protect . . . .”63 The Court took “judicial notice that 
this is a time of vigorous preparation for national defense . . . . 
[T]hese electronic devices must be kept secret if their full military 
advantage is to be exploited in the national interests.”64 But the 
Court stated that after “a formal claim of privilege” has been lodged, 
it is still for the judge to determine, in a manner that protects the 
allegedly privileged information, whether the privilege is justified 
given the circumstances of the case.65 The test proposed by the 
Court is whether “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of 
the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of 
national security, should not be divulged.”66 The necessity of the 
information to the case should also be accounted for, though “even 
the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of 
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at 
stake.”67 In Reynolds, the Court found the government’s assertion 
reasonable, particularly in light of “a dubious showing of 
necessity.”68 The Court thus held that the district court erred when 
it did not continue the case without the privileged reports.69 
C. Kasza v. Browner 
The Ninth Circuit most recently applied the state secrets 
privilege in Kasza v. Browner.70 At first glance, the case looks like it 
supports a Totten categorical bar to recovery, but in reality it follows 
the Reynolds evidentiary framework. In Kasza, former workers of a 
classified government factory sued the United States Air Force and 
the Environmental Protection Agency for violating certain health 
standards.71 However, “[o]nce discovery got underway, the Air Force 
refused to furnish almost all of the information requested on the 
ground that it was privileged.”72 The court did not bar discovery at 
 
 63. Id. at 8. 
 64. Id. at 10. 
 65. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
 66. Id. at 10. 
 67. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 11–12. 
 70. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 71. Id. at 1162. 
 72. Id. at 1163 (emphasis added). 
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the outset, but once evidence that would be excludable under the 
Reynolds state secrets test was unavailable, the plaintiffs essentially 
lost all ability to litigate the case. The case was dismissed accordingly, 
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.73 Thus Kasza advocates 
dismissing the complaint if, without inclusion of the privileged state 
secrets evidence, a plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case, or, 
alternatively, if the defendants would be deprived of an otherwise 
valid defense. 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit in Mohamed found that the categorical Totten 
bar applied by the district court, which wipes out all judicial remedies 
when state secrets are central to a plaintiff’s claims, was too harsh a 
standard.74 Instead, the court utilized the Reynolds case, which 
provides a more flexible evidentiary approach that allows the case to 
continue as long as individual pieces of evidence protected by the 
state secrets privilege are not found to be indispensable to a prima 
facie case or a valid defense.75 Finding that the case could proceed 
under the Reynolds standard, the court remanded the cases for 
further proceedings.  
A. Totten Is Too Harsh 
The government argued that Totten was a categorical bar to this 
lawsuit because plaintiff’s claims were all premised on a secret 
contract between Jeppesen and the government, much like the secret 
contract between the spy and President Lincoln in Totten.76 The 
court rejected this argument on several points. First, some of 
plaintiff’s claims did not require proving the existence of a contract 
between the government and Jeppesen.77 Plaintiffs might show only 
knowledge that the passengers were going to be tortured in order to 
prove liability. Second, Totten and its progeny are about plaintiffs 
revealing their own secret relationships with the government. 
Mohamed and his fellow plaintiffs are not seeking to reveal any sort 
of agreement they themselves have entered. Thus they are not 
 
 73. Id. at 1176. 
 74. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1001–03 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 75. Id. at 1003–04. 
 76. Id. at 1001. 
 77. Id. 
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breaking the Totten implied covenant that their own “lips [are] to be 
forever sealed,” such that suing by itself defeats recovery.78 Third, 
the language from Reynolds about Totten being a situation where the 
“very subject matter” of the case involved a state secret was only in a 
footnote and was not meant to be the foundation of a new 
expanding doctrine.79 Declining to apply the Totten bar, the court 
held that the case was wrongly dismissed under a supposed 
categorical bar to recovery based on a “very subject matter” Totten 
test.80 
B. Reynolds Is a Balance of the Legitimate Interests 
The court noted that there is a constitutional prerogative to 
provide judicial review and to check the Executive.81 The Totten bar 
completely abdicates this responsibility and gives an unhealthy 
deference to the Executive’s determination of what is a state secret. 
Throwing out the entire case thus creates a “winner-takes-all” bar to 
recovery that is too crude an instrument for balancing the delicate 
due process concerns with legitimate executive secrecy concerns.82 
The Reynolds framework, on the other hand, has been approved by 
analogous cases and reduces the “violence of the collision” between 
the executive and judicial branches.83 
The government argued that if the Reynolds framework were 
adopted, the information in the secret evidence would still be 
excludable because the information itself could be expected to harm 
national security.84 The court pounced on this argument and 
explained that information is never protected by an evidentiary 
privilege.85 For example, the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination will not prevent the prosecution from using 
 
 78. Id. at 1002 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 
11 (1953). 
 80. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1003–04. 
 81. Id. at 1003. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. “Unlike Totten, the Reynolds framework accommodates these division-of-powers 
concerns . . . without categorically immunizing the CIA or its partners from judicial scrutiny.” 
Id. at 1004. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 1004–06. 
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incriminating information obtained from other evidence sources.86 
Likewise, if the state secrets doctrine is properly invoked, it makes 
that particular piece of evidence privileged.87 However, the case goes 
on, and the information in that evidence is still discoverable from 
other sources, “regardless whether privileged evidence might also be 
probative of the truth or falsity of the [same information].”88 
C. The Freedom of Information Act Standard Does Not                    
Work for “State Secrets” 
The government tried to present arguments based on the 
Freedom of Information Act89 (“FOIA”) case law, but the court 
found them “unpersuasive.”90 The standard in FOIA cases for 
determining exempt matters is simply to take the executive’s word 
for it—if it has been deemed “classified” then it is “categorically 
exempt from disclosures that would otherwise be required under the 
Act.”91 Such a loose standard is not appropriate in the state secrets 
context. It would give complete control over determination of what 
qualifies under the privilege to the Executive Branch, “in plain 
contravention” of the Reynolds admonition to not leave control of 
evidence solely to the “‘caprice of executive officers.’”92 
 
 86. Id. at 1005. Similarly, just because some information was shared under an attorney-
client privilege does not mean parties cannot obtain that same information from another 
source. 
 87. With the only effect that “‘the evidence is unavailable, as though a witness had died 
[or a document had been destroyed], and the case will proceed accordingly, with no 
consequences save those resulting from the loss of evidence.’” Id. at 1006 (quoting Al-
Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th Cir. 2007) (alteration in 
original)).  
 88. Id. at 1005. 
 89. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2009). 
 90. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1006.  
 91. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2009). 
 92.  Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1007 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8–10 
(1953)). The court was well informed of the “abuses” that could come from giving a classified 
blank-check power to the executive, and in footnote 7 it catalogued a short history of 
embarrassing situations deemed classified whenever they have nothing to do with national 
security. The most embarrassing revelation was the accident report in Reynolds that the 
Supreme Court granted the privilege for in 1953, which was recently declassified: it revealed a 
shameful cover-up of missteps that led to those men’s deaths. It was in fact not a legitimate 
state secret—yet it is the leading case on the doctrine. 
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D. Conclusion—the Case Must Continue 
Finally, the government argued a Kasza-style dismissal applies 
because plaintiffs will not be able to bolster enough evidence for 
even a prima facie case, assuming all the evidence would be deemed 
privileged.93 The court dismissed this assertion as premature, 
explaining, “we simply cannot prospectively evaluate hypothetical 
claims of privilege that the government has not yet raised and the 
district court has not yet considered.”94 The court remanded the 
case, finding that the plaintiffs had successfully defeated a motion to 
dismiss with their “well-pleaded complaint,”95 and ordered that 
discovery proceed. 
V. ANALYSIS 
While Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., is a well-reasoned 
opinion in the right direction, the case is problematic because it 
creates a subtle incentive for government operations to become more 
secretive. This Note argues that public policy should temper the state 
secrets evidence privilege, and because “more secretive” government 
operations are against public policy, a different standard from the 
one articulated by the court should be considered in future cases. 
A. There Is an Incentive To Be More Secretive 
Even though the Mohamed opinion brings alleged victims of 
inhumane treatment one step closer to actually litigating their claims, 
only a certain type of plaintiff—“plaintiffs [that] can prove the 
‘essential facts’ of their claims ‘without resort to [privileged 
evidence]’”96—can pass the Reynolds hurdle that remains after the 
pleadings. 
This standard has yet to be applied to the plaintiffs in Mohamed 
because they have not yet requested “specific evidence” against 
which the government can formally invoke the privilege.97 
Considering that the district court will be presiding when the 
privilege is later brought forward in this case, and it has already 
 
 93. Id. at 1004. 
 94. Id. at 1008. 
 95. Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 96. Mohamed, 563 F.3d. at 1001 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11). 
 97. Id. at 1009. 
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determined that the classified information in the Hayden declaration 
justifies the state secrets doctrine,98 it is fair to assume that if these 
plaintiffs do not have outside evidence they will be later barred by 
the Reynolds privilege.99 Nevertheless, the court seemed to take 
comfort in the plaintiffs’ alleged ability to produce outside 
information as an indication that this case would ultimately survive, 
even if the Reynolds standard precluded classified evidence.100 
However, what will happen to future victims that cannot find 
outside information? They are still completely vulnerable to 
dismissal, despite the good direction that Mohamed offers. The 
prospect of dismissal naturally places an incentive on the government 
not to disclose anything purposefully and to keep a tighter control 
on the information that leaks out about its operations. In short, if 
the government were able to create a true “black box,” it would 
ensure its own immunity.101 
This incentive to create greater secrecy reinforces the Ninth 
Circuit’s earlier case on the state secrets doctrine, Al-Haramain 
Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush.102 That case involved a suit brought 
because of searches done by the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
(“TSP”) without warrants. The opinion began by rehearsing the 
government’s varied “spoon-fed” disclosures of the “contours” of 
the program—disclosures voluntarily made by the government to 
allay public concerns.103 The court seemed to chide the government’s 
assumption that it could claim the state secrets privilege whenever it 
had “moved affirmatively to engage in public discourse about the 
TSP.”104 The court suggested that “[u]nlike a truly secret or ‘black 
 
 98. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 99. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). In El-Masri, the 
facts are very similar to Mohamed. The plaintiff was a victim of the alleged “extraordinary 
rendition” program, and both the district court and the Fourth Circuit held that the Reynolds 
privilege applied after reading a classified statement from the CIA director. In contrast to 
Mohamed, the court in El-Masri rejected the idea that public evidence could still be used to 
prove information excluded by the Reynolds privilege. 
 100. See Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 997 (“Citing publicly available evidence,  
plaintiffs . . . .”); id. at 998–99 (“According to plaintiffs, publicly available evidence establishes 
that Jeppesen provided . . . .”). 
 101. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1192–93. 
 104. Id. at 1193. 
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box’ program that remains in the shadows of public knowledge,” the 
government was preventing its own defense by trying to give some 
kind of public awareness, even “[t]hough its operating parameters 
remain murky.”105 
The Ninth Circuit seems to be saying that the government 
should not let even the “contours” of its programs be known if it 
wants civil immunity. But the government commonly discloses the 
contours of its secret programs106—perhaps so that Congress, and by 
extension the people, can hold their government accountable.107 
B. Evidentiary Rules Like the State Secrets Privilege Are  
Public Policy Driven 
The incentive for the government to be more and more secretive 
is against public policy.108 Because public policy should be carefully 
weighed when applying a rule of evidence like the state secrets 
doctrine, the court should have taken it into consideration.109 
First, “[t]he Supreme Court could not be clearer that [the state 
secrets privilege] is a privilege within the law of evidence.”110 
 
 105. Id. at 1192–93. 
 106. Usually the public knows just the basic contours of secret programs because the 
government is most interested in keeping the “operating parameters . . . murky.”  
Id. at 1192–93; see, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 
1985) (“The fact that this program exists is unclassified and is well known . . . [but w]hether 
other such uses have developed from information obtained in the marine mammal program is a 
classified fact about which no official release of information has ever been made.”); 
Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 551 (2d Cir. 1991). The existence of 
the Phalanx Anti-Missile System, and other systems on board the ship, were public knowledge. 
However, “[d]esign, performance, and functional characteristics . . . are classified.” Id. 
Consider also the present case, Mohamed, and the public knowledge of the basics of the 
detention program; and consider the Al-Haramain case and public knowledge of the Terror 
Surveillance Program.  
 107. See Redacted, Unclassified Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United States, Al-
Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 08-15693), 
2008 WL 4973859. “As General Hayden’s public declaration recognizes, the President has 
made limited declassifications concerning the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation 
program. Specifically, the President has publicly acknowledged that the program existed . . . . 
The President made these limited disclosures in connection with his request to Congress to 
enact legislation . . . .” Id. § C. 
 108. This may be especially true with programs involving torture. See infra Part V.C. 
 109. Perhaps the idea was dismissed for other reasons, namely, the perverse incentive is 
unavoidable when choosing the better of two risk-fraught alternatives. But no mention is made 
of considering it in the opinion. 
 110. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953)) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Evidence law thus provides a good guide to how public policy 
should govern this rule. In the Federal Rules of Evidence, certain 
policy choices exclude probative evidence in order to avoid perverse 
incentives.111 For instance, Rule 407 removes the perverse incentive 
to not take remedial measures after an accident occurs (such as steps 
to prevent its recurrence) because a jury might see those measures as 
evidence of negligence. Rule 407 excludes evidence of remedial 
efforts in litigation, thus removing the perverse incentive to do 
nothing. 
Also, the federal rules specifically allow courts to weigh public 
policy concerns when dealing with privileges. Rule 501 says, “the 
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political 
subdivision . . . may be interpreted by the courts . . . in the light of 
reason and experience.”112 Allowing a court to use “reason and 
experience” is a decision to allow courts to consider policy when 
applying privileges like the attorney-client privilege or the state 
secrets privilege. 
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the state secrets doctrine 
derives from the common law.113 It is not statutory, nor is it based in 
the Constitution.114 Therefore, based on prevalent judicial principles, 
the court of appeals is encouraged to seek out the full gamut of 
policy concerns when applying the standard and is not bound to 
apply precedent that is based on different circumstances and 
policies.115 
 
 111. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407–11. Each of these rules recognizes a perverse incentive 
in litigation or a criminal matter that a Rule of Evidence has tried to fix. 
 112. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 113. “The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the 
government to deny discovery of military secrets.” Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1165 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 114. See Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law, Federal Jurisdiction, and Foreign 
Relations Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Mohamed and Urging Reversal at 3–5, Mohamed 
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (No. 08-15693), 2008 WL 6042363. 
 115. The court in Mohamed recognized the role of public policy calculus in deciding legal 
standards when discussing the FOIA. There the court saw one standard for FOIA claims and 
another for state secret doctrine claims. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1006–08. The justification was 
that a different mix of variables and policies went into the latter cases, thus requiring a different 
legal standard. Id. 
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C. Public Policy May be Different in Torture Cases  
The idea of a state secret stemmed from the concept that some 
secrets should not be revealed because the collective good of society 
is safeguarded in their secrecy. To wit, society is safer if there are 
legitimate clandestine activities.116 However, several considerations 
show that torture is something different from a legitimate 
clandestine activity. 
For example, in case law developing the state secrets doctrine, 
the greater good of society encouraged clandestine operations in the 
Totten, Reynolds, and Kasza cases. Totten involved run-of-the-mill 
war-time espionage, and the plaintiff wanted the government to pay 
for espionage services rendered.117 Reynolds involved Air Force 
technology, and if successful, the suit at most might have 
encouraged the government to exercise a greater duty of care on its 
planes.118 Kasza concerned naval technology, and if not dismissed by 
application of the privilege, it would have encouraged the 
government to follow environmental protocols more stringently.119 
Torture, however, is of a much more serious nature than payroll 
fraud, negligence, or regulatory compliance.  
Torture is a subject of intense international discussion and much 
scholarly writing and convincing the reader that it is unjustified 
would be impossible in this simple Note.120 However, it seems 
logical that the public policy calculus involved in allowing torture is 
 
 116. The archetypical example would be having spies at wartime. See Totten v. United 
States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
 117. Id.  
 118. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 119. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 120. From a broad standpoint, letting the government get away with torture, official 
disappearances, and secret detention is in general a serious consideration for at least six reasons: 
1) it encourages mistreatment in kind to our own soldiers and American citizens abroad; 2) it 
is a scorched earth policy that discourages enemy surrender and defection; 3) it makes martyrs 
of terrorists, galvanizes terrorism supporters in their ‘holy’ cause, and overall inflames pre-
existing hatred; 4) it erodes public confidence within the United States that our nation is one 
governed by moral norms; 5) it erodes international confidence in the United States as a 
country founded on moral constitutional principles worth emulating; and 6) because it is 
reprehensible to our allies, it alienates even our closest friends from helping us in legitimate 
anti-terrorist efforts. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of Former United States Diplomat’s 
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 563 F.3d 
992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-15693), 2008 WL 3845065. This brief makes a complete and 
cogent argument on why the extraordinary rendition program should be stopped in order to 
restore our damaged international image and regain the support of allies who find this practice 
anathema to a free society. 
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unique to torture. The formulation of a different standard is 
prudent—especially when applying the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the state secrets doctrine would allow the government to get away 
with its more heinous operations just because it has limited all public 
disclosure. And any future case, like Mohamed, that creates that 
incentive by following old state secrets standards not calibrated for 
torture should address this legitimate concern. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Mohamed opinion allows alleged victims of the CIA’s 
extraordinary rendition program to clear one more hurdle in their 
quest for justice in American courts. The Ninth Circuit made plain 
that the state secrets doctrine does not protect government 
defendants from information attainable outside of privileged 
evidence, and state secrets “at the core” of a plaintiff’s case will not 
necessarily bar recovery under the harsh Totten standard.121 Only 
time will tell, however, if this is a true victory for those committed to 
human rights because the opinion unmistakably creates a perverse 
incentive for government operations to become even more secretive. 
















 121. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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